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Castillo: Tenants' Rights

COMMENT
HOW CALIFORNIA CAN
HARMONIZE A TENANT'S STATE
RIGHTS AND A LANDLORD'S
RIGHT TO GO OUT OF BUSINESS
PURSUANT TO THE ELLIS ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

California landlords doing business in cities with strict
rent control laws have found a way to get around such laws
and capitalize on the tight housing market. 1 As of 1998 California landlords have simply relied on the utility of the Ellis
Act,2 which has been in the California law books since 1986
and prohibits government agencies from interfering with a
landlord's decision to evict tenants and withdraw rental units
from the market. 3 For example, in San Francisco, a city with
strict rent control laws, 205 buildings were Ellised from July
1998 to June 1999; a jump from 1995, when only 5 buildings
were Ellised. 4
The recent tre~d of Ellis evictions raises several legal issues about a landlord's right to go out of business pursuant to
the Ellis Act. Judicial review of the Ellis Act focuses mainly
on the intent of the Ellis Act and its effect on local ordinances. 5 Recently, the First Appellate District of the Califor1 See Edward Epstein, Better Protection Urged for Evicted S.F. Tenants, S.F.
Chron. Dec. 7, 1999, at A16; Dan Levy, New Law Gives Disabled, Older Tenants a
Break, S.F. Chron., Oct. 9, 1999, at A18.
2 See Levy, supra note 1, at A18.
a See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060 (West 2000).
4 See Levy, supra note 1, at A18.
6 See City of Santa Monica v. Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d 153 (1988); Javidzad v.
City of Santa Monica, 204 Cal. App. 3d 524 (1988).
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nia Court of Appeal balanced the relationship between the Ellis Act and a state statutory law prohibiting retaliatory
evictions. 6 The First Appellate District held that a tenant may
not assert the retaliatory eviction defense to an Ellis eviction
if the landlord complied with the procedural requirements of
the Act. 7
.
Although the First Appellate District of the California
Court of Appeal stated that a tenant retains the right to sue
a landlord under the retaliatory eviction statute, the practical
ability for a tenant to sue for retaliation is slim.8 As such, the
First Appellate District in essence upheld a landlord's right
under the Ellis Act at the expense of a tenant's substantive
right. 9 The approach places the retaliatory eviction statute,
and other substantive tenants' rights, in jeopardy if California
courts follow the First Appellate District of the California
Court of Appeal.
.
To overcome the unbalanced a,pproach taken by the First
Appellate District, persuasive California judicial authority exists for courts to harmonize the right given to a landlord
under the Ellis Act and the rights given to tenants under
state law without limiting the rights of either a landlord or a
tenant. 10 Specifically, the procedural requirements for an Ellis
eviction can be viewed as tenant-protections that supplement
rights given to tenants by state law, rather than a limit on
those rights. l l This approach is consistent with the express
language of the Ellis Act, its legislative history and case law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EVENTS LEADING TO THE ELLIS ACT

The California state legislature enacted the Ellis Act in
1986. 12 The Act prohibits a public entity from interfering with
See Drouet v. Sup. Ct., 2001 WL 102304 (Ct. App. 1 Diat. February 7, 2001).
See id.
S See Robert Selna, Tenants Lose Powerful Tool in Fighting Ellis Evictions, S.F.
Daily Journal, Feb. 9, 2001, at 1.
9 See id. at 3.
10 See Rich v. Schwab, 63 Cal. App. 4th 803 (1998).
11 See id.
12 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.
6

7
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a landlord's decision to withdraw its rental accommodations
from the market and go out of the rental business. 13 The legislature drafted and passed the Act in direct response to the
California Supreme Court's decision in Nash v. City of Santa
Monica. 14
In Nash, a Santa Monica landlord challenged the constitutionality of a Santa Monica ordinance that required a landlord who desired to remove rental units from the market, by
demolition or conversion, to obtain a permit from the city's
rent board. 15 Permits were authorized only if the landlord
could show that: 1) the unit was not occupied by a person or
family of very low, low, or moderate income, 2) the unit was
not affordable to persons or families of very low, low, or moderate income, 3) the removal would not adversely affect the
housing supply in the city, and 4) the landlord could not
make a fair return by renting the unit. 16 Nash, the landlord,
claimed that the ordinance deprived him of his property without due process of lawY
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County agreed with
N ash and determined the ordinance to be unconstitutional. 18
Subsequently, the City of Santa Monica appealed the Superior
Court's decision to the California Supreme Court.19 Whether a
landlord has the right to go out of the rental business was an
issue of first impression for the California Supreme Court.20
The California Supreme Court analyzed the issue by applying a "rational relationship" test, which requires ordinances and statutes to bear a substantial connection to public
health, safety, morals, or public welfare. 21 The California Supreme Court determined that the ordinance was in response
to the housing crisis in the City of Santa Monica, therefore,
See id. § 7060 (a).
"It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to supersede any
holding or portion of any holding in Nash . . . to the extent that the holding, or portion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of
business." Id. § 7060.7. See Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 37 Cal. 3d 97 (984).
15 See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 100-0I.
16 See id. at lOI.
17 See id. at 102.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See Nash, 37 Cal. 3d at 102.
21 See id. at 103.
13
14
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bearing a substantial connection to the public welfare. 22 In addition, the ordinance placed an indirect minimal burden upon
the landlord's liberty interest to demolish the unit. 23 As such,
the California Supreme Court held that a landlord did not
have a constitutional right, free from government interference, to go out of business. 24
Landlords in California did not view Nash favorably. 25
Nash stood as an impediment for landlords who chose to withdraw rental units from the market without obtaining prior
government approval,26 Consequently, the California state legislature addressed and resolved this concern through the enactment of the Ellis Act. 27

B.

THE ELLIS ACT

California Senator Jim Ellis (R-San Diego) brought the
concern of landlords to the state legislature and introduced
Senate Bill 505 (The Ellis Act) in 1985. 28 The bill successfully
passed through the Senate in 1986. 29 Subsequently, George
Dukmejian, then Governor of California, approved and signed
the bill into law. 30
The express provisions of the Ellis Act prohibit a public
entity from compelling a landlord to remain in the residential
rental business when a landlord seeks to withdraw all such
accommodations from the market pursuant to the Act. 31 HowSee id. at 104.
See id.
:u See id.
25 See California Ass'n of Realtors, Right to Cease Business As A Landlord of
Residential Property: A Statement of Support by the California Association of Realtors, at 3, 'II 3 (1985).
26 See id.
27 "It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to supersede any
holding or portion of any holding in Nash ... to the extent that the holding, or portion of the holding, conflicts with this chapter, so as to permit landlords to go out of
business." CAL. Gov'T CODE.§ 7060.7.
28 See Letter from Jim Ellis, California Senator, 39th district, to George
Deukmejian, Governor of California (Sept. 13, 1985) (on file with the California Secretary of State) stating that he is the author of S.B. 505.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 "No public entity ... shall ... compel the owner of any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in the property for rent or
22
23
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ever, local government is permitted to adopt notice requirements, consistent with the procedural guidelines of the Ellis
Act, when a landlord seeks to withdraw its rental units from
the rental market pursuant to the Act. 32 Under the Ellis Act,
landlords choosing to evict tenants are required to file their
intent to withdraw rental accommodations from the market
with local rent boards. 33 Furthermore, the Act does permit
land use regulation under certain circumstances. 34 Specifically, the Act permits the government to enforce environmental standards, require approval for conversions of property
from one type to another, and require permits for the demolition of a structure. 35
In addition, the legislature provided protections to tenants facing an Ellis eviction. Section 7060.1(d) of the Act
states that the Act, in effect, does not supersede substantive
tenant rights under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Unfair Business Practices Act,
and the Civil Code. 36 The latter includes, among other things,
the California statute prohibiting retaliatory evictions. 37 Section 7060.6 of the Act, the only section addressing tenant defenses, permits tenants to raise procedural defects as an aflease." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060(a).
32 See id. § 7060.4(a)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
33 "Any public entity which .... has in effect any control or system of control on
the price at which accommodations are offered for rent . . . may require . . . the
owner notify the entity of an intention to withdraw those accommodations from rent."
id. § 7060.4(a).
34 See id. § 7060.7(a)(b).
35 "[T]his act is not otherwise intended to do any of the following: (a) Interfere
with ... government authority over land use, including regulation of the conversion
of existing housing to condominiums or other subdivided interests or to other nonresidential use following its withdrawal from rent or lease ... (b) Preempt local ... environmental or land use regulations . . . that govern the demolition and redevelopment
of residential property." [d.
36 "Notwithstanding section 7060, nothing in this chapter does any of the following: ... (d) Supersedes any provision of Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 7260),
part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of this code, Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 17200) of Part 2 of Division 7 of the Business and
Professions Code, Part 2 (commencing with Section 43) of Division 1 of the Civil
Code, Title 5 (commencing with Section 1925) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil
Code, Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1159) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, or Division 24 (commencing with Section 33000) of the Health and
Safety Code." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.1(d).
37 See id.
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firmative defense to an Ellis eviction. 38

C.

AMENDMENTS TO THE ELLIS ACT

Ellis evictions increased drastically during the latter half
of the 1990s,39 decreasing the availability of residential housing in California. 40 The California Senate approached the
problem by amending the notice requirements provided by the
Ells Act.41 Initially, the Act required landlords to serve tenants, being displaced pursuant to the Ellis Act, with a 60day eviction notice. 42 As an attempt to slow down Ellis evictions, the amendment increased the eviction notice date from
60 to 120 days.43 If a tenant is elderly or disabled, the tenant,
upon being served with an eviction notice has up to 60 days
to extend the eviction notice from 120 days to one year from
the time the eviction notice was ·served. 44
In addition to amending the notice requirements, the legislature amended the Ellis Act to allow local governments
with rent control ordinances to enforce such ordinances if, after two years from being withdrawn, the rental units were
placed back on the rental market. 45 Furthermore, if a landlord
offers to rent the accommodations for residential purposes
within ten years from the time the accommodations were originally withdrawn from the market, the landlord must give the
displaced tenant the first right of refusal. 46
38 "If an owner seeks to displace a tenant ... from accommodations withdrawn
from rent or lease pursuant to this chapter by an unlawful detainer proceeding, the
tenant or lessee may appear and answer or demur
... and may assert by way of defense that the owner has not complied with the
applicable provisions of this chapter, or statutes, ordinances, or regulations of public
entities adopted to implement this chapter, as authorized by this chapter." [d. §
7060.6.
39 For example, in San Francisco 205 buildings were Ellised from July 1998 to
June 1999 - a jump from 1995, when only 5 buildings were Ellised. See Levy, supra
note 1, at A18.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 7060.4(a).
43 See id. § 7060.4(b) (West Supp. 2000).
44 See id.
45 See id § 7060.2(a).
46 See id. § 7060.2(a)(4).
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DISCUSSION

The California appellate courts have considered the effect
of the Ellis Act on local ordinances and state laws. 47 In City of
Santa Monica v. Yarmark 48 and Javidzad v. City of Santa
Monica,49 the Second Appellate District of the California
Court of Appeal addressed whether local governments could
limit or restrict Ellis evictions. 50 Mter examining the intent of
the Ellis Act, the court declared that a landlord has an unfettered right under the Ellis Act to go out of business without
government interference. 51
Recently in Drouet v. Superior Court,52 the First Appellate
District for the California Court of Appeal addressed whether
state statutory rights given to tenants, rather than by local
ordinances, limit the Ellis Act. In Drouet the court interpreted
the relationship between the Ellis Act and the state statutory
right prohibiting retaliatory evictions. 53 The court held that a
tenant may not assert the retaliatory eviction defense in an
Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceeding where the landlord
complies with the procedural requirements of the Act. 54 The
court stated that a tenant asserting the retaliatory eviction
defense interfered with the right of a landlord to go out of
business under the Ellis Act. 55 The court noted that a tenant
could, however, bring a cause of action for retaliation after
the tenant has vacated the rental unit. 56

A. CITY OF SANTA MONICA V YARMARK
In Yarmark, Yarmark sought to withdraw his rental units
from the market under the Ellis Act and served a 30 day notice to his tenants, as required for month to month tenan47 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153; Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 524;
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 1.
48 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153.
49 See Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 524.
50 See id. See also Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153.
51 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 162. See also Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at
524.
52 See Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 1.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 13.
55 See id. at 11.
56 See id. at 13.
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cies. 57 However, Yarmark did not obtain any of the required
permits or comply with any of the limitations for evictions required by the City of Santa Monica ordinance. 58 Consequently,
the City of Santa Monica filed suit against Yarmark for declaratory and injunctive relief contending the evictions violated city ordinances. 59 Yarmark defended on the grounds that
the city ordinances violated the Ellis Act. 60
The Second Appellate District of the California Court of
Appeal agreed with Yarmark and invalidated the city ordinances. 61 The court determined that the Ellis Act has two essential purposes: 1) to prevent public entities from interfering
with a landlord who decides to withdraw units from the
rental residential business and complies with the Act's terms
and 2) to permit landlords the unfettered right to remove all
residential rental units from the market, consistent with the
guidelines set forth in the Act and adopted by local governments. 62 Because the ordinance interfered with a landlord's
right to withdraw his rental units in accordance with the Act,
the California Court of Appeal invalidated the local
ordinances. 63

B. JAVIDZAD

V. CITY OF SANTA MONICA

In Javidzad, the California Court of Appeal invalidated
another provision of the same ordinance at issue in
Yarmark. 64 There, Javidzad sought to withdraw the rental
units from the market and demolish the building. 65 However,
a City of Santa Monica ordinance required Javidzad to obtain
a permit from the local rent board upon a showing that he
could not make a fair return by continuing to rent the property, or that the property was uninhabitable and incapable of
being habitable. 66 Consequently, Javidzad challenged the ordi67

58
69

60
61

62
63
64
65
66

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 157-58.
id. at 158-59.
id.
id.
id. at 153.
Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 164-66.
id.
Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 524.
id. at 528.
id. at 526-27.
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nance as a violation of the Ellis Act. 67
The trial court ruled in favor of Javidzad, stating that the
permit requirements did not allow landlords to simply go out
of the rental business. 68 As such, the trial court held that the
ordinance compelled landlords to stay in the rental market in
violation of the Ellis Act. 69 Therefore, the trial court mandated the rent board to process the demolition permit without
requiring Javidzad to obtain a removal permit from the
board. 70
The rent board appealed to the California Court of Appeal
arguing that the Ellis Act permits local governments to regulate land use.71 In its opinion, the court stated that while the
Ellis Act permits local governments to regulate the subsequent use of the property once the property has been properly
removed under the Ellis Act, the city ordinance placed impermissible burdens on a landlord's right to go out of business
and did not regulate the subsequent use of the property. 72
Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. 73

III.

DROUET V. SUPERIOR COURT

In Drouet v. Superior Court, the First Appellate District
of the California Court of Appeal considered the relationship
between the Ellis Act and a state statutory right given to tenants. 74 In Drouet, Joel Drouet owned a two unit apartment
building in San Francisco. 75 In 1999, tenants complained to
Drouet about a leaking shower wall, sewage drain, and a deteriorating back stairway, however, Drouet failed to make the
repairs.76 Shortly thereafter, Drouet initiated the procedural
steps required to make an Ellis eviction by filing with the local rent board his intent to withdraw rental units off the market, providing the tenants with an eviction notice, and filing
67
68

69
70
71
72

73

7.
75
76

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 528.
id.
Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 528-29.
id.
id. at 529.
id.
id. at 531.
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 1.
id.
id.
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with the local rent board a second notice of intent. 77
After being served with the eviction notice, the tenants
failed to evacuate the apartment unit. 78 Consequently, Drouet
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer to evict the tenants. 79
The tenants answered the complaint and asserted four defenses, including the retaliatory eviction defense. 8o Drouet
moved for summary judgment on each of the defenses. 81 The
trial court granted the motion in part but denied the motion
as to retaliatory eviction. 82
Drouet then filed a writ of mandate with the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of San Francisco and sought to
compel the trial court to grant the summary judgment motion. 83 The Appellate Division granted Drouet's writ and held
that a tenant cannot assert the retaliatory eviction defense if
the landlord complied with the procedural requirements of the
Ellis Act. 84 The tenants filed a writ with the First Appellate
District of the California Court of Appeal and appealed the
decision. 85
The First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal agreed with the Appellate Division of the San Francisco
Superior Court and held that a tenant may not assert the retaliatory eviction defense to an Ellis eviction. 86 The court concluded that a tenant may assert as a defense to an Ellis eviction only that the landlord failed to comply with the
procedural requirement of the Ellis Act. 87 The court noted,
however, that a tenant is not barred from filing a cause of action against the tenant for retaliation. 88
The court approached the issue with the purpose of giving
effect to the overriding legislative intent of the Ellis Act and
77
78
79

80
8!

82
83
84

85

86
87

88

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 2.
id.
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 2.
id.
id.
id.
id.
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 2.
id.
id. at 13.
id.
id.
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the retaliatory eviction statute. 89 In doing so, the court determined that the legislature did not intend to restrict a landlord's right to go out of the rental market by permitting tenants to assert the defense of retaliatory eviction. 90 According
to the court, if a tenant is permitted to assert the defense, an
unintended and massive barrier is created between the right
of the landlord to go out of business and the ability to bring
that right to fruition in accordance with the Ellis Act. 91
The court stated that the explicit provisions of the Act do
not permit a tenant to assert the defense of retaliatory eviction. 92 Section 7060.l(d) of the Act states that the right
granted to a landlord does not "supersede" several substantive
state rights, including the Civil Code. 93 The court determined
that the term "supersede," in reference to the Civil Code, did
not mean that the retaliatory eviction defense - found in a
single statute - remained applicable. 94 The court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of the Ellis
Act. 95 The court also explained that, because a landlord is not
obligated to maintain a habitable premise once the landlord's
building is Ellised, the landlord is not subject to an eviction
defense. 96
The court explained further that a distinction exists between an Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceeding and one filed
in the ordinary course of a landlord-tenant relationship.97 In a
typical retaliatory eviction scenario, the landlord fails to fulfill
the legal obligation to provide a habitable rental unit and
files an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict the tenant. 98 In
that scenario,· the landlord intends to remain in the rental
market and use the property to generate income. 99 The deterrent effect of the retaliatory eviction statute remains in full
89

90
91
92

93

94

95
96

97
98
99

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 10.
id. at II.
id.
id. at 9.
id.
Drouet, 2001 WI 102304 at 9.
id.
id. at 12.
id. at 11.
id.
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 11.
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force under such circumstances. loo According to the court, a
. landlord is not, however, in the rental market when filing an
Ellis Act unlawful detainer proceeding. lol The court stated
that when the landlord complies with all procedural requirements of the Ellis Act and the tenant does not vacate after
the 120 day grace period, then the tenancy ceases to exist. 102
In addition, the court found the legislative history of the
Ellis Act inconclusive on how to resolve the tension between
the Ellis Act and the retaliatory eviction statute. 103 In a footnote, the court emphasized portions of the legislative reports
which stated that a landlord is "probably" prohibited from
evicting tenants under the Act, if the eviction is a response to
a tenant's request for repairs or housing code violations. l04
The reports state that, under such circumstance the eviction
"could" be deemed a prohibited retaliatory eviction. l05 The
court qualified the terms "probably" and "could" as equivocal
and found the use of such terms in the legislative history to
be uncertain about the consequences of the statutory language. 106 The court concluded that the reasonable solution for
resolving the tension between the Ellis Act and the retaliatory eviction statute is to permit tenants to sue landlords for
damages, not to assert the retaliatory eviction defense. l07

N.

CRITIQUE

The First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal in Drouet upheld the right of landlords under the Ellis
Act while trumping the rights of tenants completely under the
retaliatory eviction statute. !Os In Drouet, the court suggested a
distorted image of the truth about what rights remain for tenants under the retaliatory eviction statute when faced with
an Ellis eviction. Although the court notes that a tenant retains the right to sue for damages for retaliatory eviction, the
100
101
102
103

104
105
106
107
108

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. at 13 n.9.
Drouet, 2001 WL 102304 at 13 n.9.
id.
id.
id. at 12.
Selna, supra note 8, at 3.
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right is practically nonexistent. lo9 The First Appellate District
in Drouet imposed a harsh blow to tenants without a complete
consideration of the Ellis Act. The text of the Ellis Act and its
legislative history suggest that other California appellate
courts, including the Supreme Court and other appellate districts, should not follow the First Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeal when balancing the rights granted
to a tenant by state law and the right granted to a landlord
by the Ellis Act.

A.

TEXT OF THE ELLIS ACT

The Ellis Act was a direct response to Nash, where the
local government placed complete discretion into the hands of
its rent control board to decide when and how a landlord may
withdraw its rental units from the market. llo It is this type of
local control that the Ellis Act intends to prohibit. A close examination of the express language of the Ellis Act supports
this view.
Textually, the express language of the Ellis Act prohibits
a "public entity" from compelling a landlord to remain in the
rental market. 111 The California Government Code defines a
"public entity" as government and not a private individual. 112
Thus, the express language of the Ellis Act does not prohibit
individuals from asserting their substantive rights in an Ellis
proceeding as a defense to an eviction. Even if the effect of asserting such rights is to compel landlords to remain in the
rental market and force them to oblige by their duties as
landlords, the Ellis Act offers no protection to the landlord
when the eviction is in violation of tenants' rights. As section
7060.l(d) states, the right granted to landlords does not supersede several substantive tenants' rights, including the retaliatory eviction statute. 113 Instead, the Ellis Act prohibits
only a "public entity", i.e., government, from forcing a landSee id.
See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.7.
III See id. § 7060.
112 " 'Public entity' includes the State, the Regents of the University of California,
a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State."
1d. § 811.2.
113 See id. § 7060.l(d).
109

110
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lord to stay in the rental market, as in Nash. U4
Both Yarmark and Javidzad support the interpretation
that the Ellis Act bars only government from interfering with
a landlord's decision to go out of business. In each case the focus is on government ordinances adopted to limit a landlord's
right under the Ellis Act. 115 For example, in Javidzad and
Yarmark, the Second District of the California Court of Appeal held that an ordinance requiring landlords to obtain permits prior to withdrawing rental units from the market forces
a landlord to remain in the rental market and is therefore in
violation of the Ellis Act.u6

B.

LEGISLATNE HISTORY

From a historical stance, the legislative committee reports on the Ellis Act are consistent with the understanding
that the Ellis Act bars public entities, not individuals, from
compelling a landlord to remain in business.ll7 For example,
in a statement of support, the California Association of Realtors (CAR) stated that the Act prohibits government from
compelling a landlord to remain in business. us CAR's concern
was to limit the ability of local governments from interfering
with a landlord's business decision to go out of the rental
market. CAR explained that the government should not interfere with a landlord's financial and psychological demands,
which affect a landlord's willingness to stay in the rental market.ll9 A landlord, not a government agency, is better situated
114 "No public entity, as defined in Section 811.2, shall ... compel the owner of
any residential real property ... to continue to offer ... accommodations in the property for rent or lease."
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.
115 See Yarmark, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 153. See also Javidzad, 204 Cal. App. 3d at
524.
116 See id.
117 See California Ass'n of Realtors, supra, note 25, 'II 5 at 1.
118 In its report CAR argued that the Ellis Act "[l]imits its application to actions
of the state or any . .. political subdivisions . .. or regulation or administrative action
implementing such statute . . . ." See id.
119
"Requiring a person to continue to offer ... property for rent is a requirement that ... involves ... personal liability (including ... strict liability) ... and a
continued devotion of personal services ... including psychological demands ... as
evidenced by the pressures of tenant relations ... and contrary to sound public policy
affecting involuntary servitudes." Id. at 3, 'II 2.
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to handle those demands appropriately.120
In addition, the Ellis Act clearly states that the right
granted to landlords does not supersede any of the substantive state rights afforded to tenants in the Unruh Civil Rights
Act, Fair Employment and Housing Act, Community Redevelopment Law, Business Professions Code, and the Civil Code,
including the retaliatory eviction defense. 121 The legislative
committee reports on the Ellis Act clearly explain this provision of the Ellis Act.1 22 It states that "[t]his provision would
limit a landlord's right to go out of business if the exercise of
that right would jeopardize a tenant's rights under state
law."123 As an example of the limitation placed on the Ellis
Act, the legislative reports provide that if a tenant were
evicted in retaliation for complaining to authorities of dilapidations, the landlord would probably not be permitted to evict
the tenant under the Ellis Act.124
V.

PROPOSAL

If the legislature intends to leave the tenant defense
against retaliatory evictions intact, and other substantive tenants' rights, the legislature should amend the Ellis Act and
make its intention clear. Until the legislature amends the
statute, the California courts should approach the issue with
the intent of harmonizing both the procedural guidelines provided in the Ellis Act and the right given to tenants under
the California Civil Code prohibition against retaliatory evictions, and other substantive tenants' rights. This approach is
120 CAR argued in its report that "[tlhe right to terminate a business involves a
personal decision concerning the individual's ability to use his or her talents and resources in a manner best suited to bring reasonable satisfaction to that individual in
the application and utilization of that person's time and efforts, and a determination
by them of their economic security." See id. at 3, 'f[ 3.
121 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.l(d).
122 Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 505 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.)
as amended May 15, 1985.
123 See id. at 3.
124 "This provision would limit a landlord's right to go out of business if the exercise of that right would jeopardize a tenant's rights under state law. For example,
this provision would probably prohibit a landlord from going out of business if the
tenant had requested repairs or reported housing code violations. An eviction of the
tenant under such circumstances could be deemed a prohibited retaliatory eviction."
[d.
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preferable over upholding one statute and trumping another.
The goal should be to permit the exercise of statutory rights
afforded to both tenants and landlords, not to create a situation where it appears the legislature gives rights to its citizenry with one hand but takes it away with the other.
The California Court of Appeal in Rich v Schwab followed
this approach in a similar context. 125 In Rich, the California
Court of Appeal addressed the availability of the California
Civil Code prohibition against retaliatory evictions within the
context of mobile home tenants and the Mobile home Residency Law (MHRL).126 In Rich, mobile home tenants faced an
increase in rent after complaining to local authorities of a previous rent increase. 127 Although the landlord followed the procedural steps for rent increases outlined in MHRL, the tenants refused to pay the increase and instead brought a class
action suit against the landlord alleging a violation of the California Civil Code prohibition of retaliatory evictions. 128 The
landlord argued that the mobile home tenants could sue
under the MHRL only for failure to comply with procedure
outlined in MHRL.129
The Fourth Appellate District of the California Court of
Appeal disagreed with the landlord. 130 The court explained
that where separate statutes relating to the same subject
matter are in conflict the court is to construe them together
and harmonize. 131 The California Court of Appeal would not
presume that the legislature enacted a statute with the intent
of overruling long-established principles of law, unless the
statute clearly declares such an overthrow. 132
.
See Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 803.
The MHRL grants owners of mobile homes occupied within mobile home
parks greater notice protection for rent increases, changes in the terms of their tenancy, and limits the circumstances under which they may be evicted. See id. at 813;
See also CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 798.30, 798.55.
127 See id. at 808-09.
The retaliatory eviction statute also prohibits rent increases against a tenant for
the purpose of retaliating against a tenant who asserts its rights as a tenant. See
CAL. Cry. CODE § 1942.5.
128 See Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 808-09.
129 See id. at 811-12.
130 See id. at 814.
131 See id. (quoting Palmer v. Agee, 87 Cal. App. 3d 377, 383 (1978».
132 See id.
125

126
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The California Court of Appeal determined that, although
the MHRL provides a basis for a mobile home tenant to sue a
landlord, it is not exclusive. 133 The court also determined that
the procedural protections afforded to mobile home tenants
under the MHRL did not affect the rights afforded to mobile
home tenants under the California Civil Code prohibition of
retaliatory evictions. 134 The court explained that the procedural protections in the MHRL were supplemental, and not a
limitation, on the rights afforded to mobile home tenants
under the California Civil Code's prohibition against retaliatory evictions. 135 Therefore, the tenants still retained the full
protections of the California Civil Code prohibition of retaliatory evictions. 136
The procedural protections under the MHRL at issue in
Rich are similar to the procedural protections of the Ellis Act.
Although the Ellis Act was created to protect landlords, not
tenants, the landlord is subject to several limitations outlined
by the Act itself 137 Included in those limitations are the procedural requirements for evicting a tenant under the Ellis
Act. 138 The procedural guidelines of the Act are notice requirements given to tenants designed essentially for their own protection. 139 As such, the procedural guidelines in the Ellis Act
are the equivalent of the procedural protections found in the
MHRL at issue in Rich. 140
Accordingly, Rich is persuasive authority for arguing that
the procedural protections under the Ellis Act are supplemental to, rather than a limitation upon the defenses available to
a tenant facing an Ellis eviction. Implicit in this proposal is
the requirement that a landlord exercise its rights without
trampling on the rights of others. Such an implication is not
the equivalent of giving a landlord the right to go out of business and then taking it away. The landlord would still have
the right under the Ellis Act to go out of business, free from
133
134

135
136

137
138
139
140

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 814.
id.
id.
id.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7060.
id. § § 7060.4, 7060.6
id. § 7060.6.
Rich, 63 Cal. App. 4th at 813.
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government interference. However, the landlord may not do so
to retaliate for a tenant's actions or other proper assertion of
rights afforded to a tenant by state law. This proposal merely
places landlords within the realm of the law and not above it.
In doing so, this proposal protects the right given to landlords
under the Ellis Act and the right granted to tenants by state
law, including the California Civil Code prohibition against
retaliatory evictions, without compromising the rights of either a landlord or a tenant.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Based on the legislative intent of the Ellis Act and persuasive California judicial authority, the procedural guidelines of the Ellis Act are not the exclusive protections available to a tenant during an Ellis proceeding. The procedural
requirements of the Ellis Act can be considered tenantprotections that are supplemental to rights granted to a tenant by state law - the latter includes the California Civil
Code prohibition against retaliatory evictions. This approach
alleviates tension between the rights granted to tenants by
state law and the right granted to landlords under the Ellis
Act.
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